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DOUBLE JEOPARDY
or arise from the same transaction, or from connected transactions or
form part of a common scheme or plan. Rule 8(b) provides for joinder of
defendants. Rule 13 provides for joinder of separate indictments or in-
formations in a single trial where the offenses alleged could have been
included in one indictment or information.
In concluding, a quotation from the last paragraph of Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion in Ashe would be relevant
Abuse of the criminal process is foremost among the feared evils
that led to the inclusion of the Double Jeopardy Clause in the Bill
of Rights. That evil will be most effectively avoided, and the Clause
can thus best serve its worthy ends, if "same offence" is construed
to embody the "same transaction" standard. Then both federal and
state prosecutors will be prohibited from mounting successive
prosecutions for offenses growing out of the same criminal episode,
at least in the absence of a showing of unavoidable necessity for
successive prosecutions in the particular case.13
Thus, until the same transaction standard, as espoused by Mr. Justice
Brennan, is adopted by all of the courts in our country, the Fifth Amend-
ment protection against double jeopardy will remain devoid of meaning.
DONNIE HOOVER
The Affirmative Duty to Desegregate State Systems of Higher
Education Without Eliminating Racially Identifiable Schools-
I. INTRODUCTION
In Adams v. Richardson, the appellees, citizens and taxpayers brought
an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against appellants, Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare and the Director of HEW's Office of Civil
Rights. They alleged that appellants had been derelict in their duty to en-
force Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because appellants had not
taken suitable and timely action to end segregation in public educational in-
stitutions receiving federal funds. Title VI provides that discrimination in
federally assisted programs must cease or those programs will no longer
be federally assisted. 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the District
13 397 U.S. at 459-460.
1 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
2 42 U.S.C. § 200d (1964) provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
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of Columbia affirmed and modified a District Court order to desegregate
those state systems of higher education not in compliance with Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3 It held that enforcement must follow
in absence of voluntary compliance within a reasonable time; that more time
is required with respect to systems of higher education than was provided
by the District Court; and that limited monitoring by HEW could be re-
quired with respect to school districts under court orders to desegregate.
The purpose of this comment is to examine and analyze the court's
determination that: (1) because of its inexperience, HEW must use caution
and care in desegregating colleges and universities; 4 and (2) Black schools
do and should play a significant role in higher education. Particular at-
tention will be given to the part these determinations play in the final ac-
ceptance by the Court of HEW's justifications for delay and inaction.
II. BACKGROUND OF ADAMS
In attempting to desegregate the public schools, resistance emanated
from many sources. There may have been more resistance in this field
than in any other type of civil rights litigation.5 Before and after Brown
v. Board of Education,6 various forms of resistance to school desegregation
were attempted: economic reprisals, legislation, closing of schools and on
more than one occasion, outright violence. 7 Even today many school
children attend segregated schools although Brown was decided two dec-
ades ago. The courts were faced with a Herculean task. Their case-by-
case approach could not have feasibly brought about meaningful deseg-
regation.
To alleviate this snail-like pace of desegregation, Congress passed
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act." Obviously, Congress thought the act
would provide a fresh approach-a national policy of public school deseg-
regation. All federal departments, including the Office of Education, were
authorized to issue rules and regulations to insure that the provisions of
Title VI would be carried out. 9 Although there was a possibility that some
would reject assistance rather than eliminate segregation, the likelihood
was that the school districts would opt for the much needed federal funds
even though it meant the removal of segregated bastions. Because most
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 200d, 200d-4 (1964).
S480 F.2d 1159 at 1165.
Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 Va. L. Rev.
42 (1967); Bell, Foreword, I BLACK LAW JOURNAL 192 (1971).
6 Massive resistance was characterized and in some instances presently by laws and res-
olutions adopted for the purpose of thwarting, using dilatory tactics, in refusal to implement
school desegregation. Mississippi during the 1950's adopted interposition statutes; Virginia
in one county disestablished its public school system.
W. VOLKOMER, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 655 ( ).
1 55 GEORGETOWN L.J. 325-51 (1966-67).
9 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-1.
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DESEGREGATION
school districts in the country were receiving federal funds, the expecta-
tion was that Title VI would assist the courts in gaining compliance. 10
As might have been expected of any plan in its initial stages, Title VI
caused confusion. For one thing, the beneficiaries of the federal educational
assistance-Blacks-were simultaneously the victims, however indirect, of
the sanctions of Title VI. If the schools went without federal assistance,
then so did the Blacks.
By January, 1969, HEW had concluded that Louisiana was operating
a racially segregated system of higher education in violation of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Between the months of January, 1969 and
February, 1970, HEW made the same determination regarding the systems
of higher education in the states of Mississippi, Oklahoma, North Carolina,
Florida, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Maryland, and Virginia.
Letters from HEW were sent out to the states, requesting them to submit
a desegregation plan within 120 days or less. Five states totally ignored"
the letter and although five others submitted plans, these were found un-
acceptable. HEW failed formally to comment on any of the submissions
afterwards, i.e. before the Adams case. As recently as June, 1973, HEW
required these states to submit follow-up desegregation plans.
III. EVOLUTION OF ADAMS
In Green v. County School Board,'2 the Supreme Court held that a
state had an affirmative duty to dismantle its racially segregated educa-
tional systems. Even freedom of choice plans would not absolve the boards'
duty to eradicate racially identifiable schools.' 3 Green applied to lower
education. Later a lower court, in Alabama State Teachers Association
v. Alabama Public School and College Authority, refused to apply Green
to higher education.14 Here the court had to rule on legislation which
permitted Auburn, a predominantly white university to establish a branch
campus in Montgomery through the sale of bonds, although Alabama State
College, a predominantly Black college, already existed in the city.' 5
The court acknowledged that in Lee v. Macon County Board of Education 6
it had required the junior and senior colleges within the state to refrain
from discrimination and begin faculty desegregation. However, the court
10 55 GEORGETOWN L.J. 347 (1966-67).
11 Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 at 1164.
12 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
13 Freedom of choice exists when students have the right to select the school they wish
to attend.
14 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
15 Id.
16267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967), affd Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215,
88 S.Ct. 415. 19 L.Ed. 2d 422 (1967), United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education
372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir., 1966); affd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967) cert. denied, Board of
Education of City of Bessemer v. United States, 389 U.S. 840, (1967).
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in reference to the extent of this policy said:
.. ."We do not agree, however, with the characterization of the
college authorities conduct, nor do we agree that the scope of the
duty should be extended as far in higher education as it has been
in the elementary and secondary public schools area." 1 7
The Alabama Court based its position on three arguments. 8 It thought
consideration should be given to the significant differences between elemen-
tary and secondary public schools, and institutions of higher education.
Secondly, the court voted that students should be free to choose what
college they wanted to attend since attendance was neither compulsory
nor free. This was also a distinction with the elementary and secondary
school levels. Thirdly, the court felt that the student's freedom to select
a school of his or her choice served an important educational prerogative:
matching the right school with the right student. The Supreme Court
affirmed the court's approach. 19
About a month later, a Tennessee Court in Sanders v. Ellington took
a different approach to Green and held that it was the duty of a state to
desegregate its colleges and universities beyond a non-discriminatory ad-
mission policy.20 The court found the existence of a dual system of higher
education and cited Green as a mandate to disestablish the duality.
Acknowledging Green and Brown, the court said:
... the court is convinced that there is an affirmative duty imposed
upon the state by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States to dismantle the dual system of higher education
which presently exists in Tennessee. 21
The court required plans from both parties designed to effect deseg-
regation. In dictum, the court stated that:
... "Although it was not specifically commented on by witness,
that the failure to make A & I (Tennessee State University, 99%
Black) a viable, desegregated institution in the near future is going
to lead to its continual deterioration as an institution of higher
learning. I think everybody recognizes that. It is clearly apparent
on that record that something must be done for that school and that
the one thing that is absolutely essential is a substantial desegregation
of that institution by whatever means can be devised by the best
minds that the State of Tennessee can bring to it." 22
This view, that a racially identifiable school was unconstitutional,
17 289 F. Supp. 784, 787 (M.D. Ala. 1%8); for a discussion of both Sanders and Alabama
Teachers, see 82 Harvard L. Rev. 1757 (1%9) and 69 Columbia L. Rev. 112 (1969).
18 Id. at 787, 789.
19 37 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1969), aff'd per curiam, 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala.
1968).
10 288 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
21 Id. at 942.
22 Id. at 943.
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was not followed by Alabama State Teachers2 3 nor by Adams. 24
Adams supports Sanders' thesis that higher education systems should
be desegregated. Furthermore Adams said that enforcement would follow
in the absence of voluntary compliance within a reasonable time. Enforce-
ment would come through the termination of federal assistance or by any
other means provided by law. The court did not address itself to the problem
posed by schools refusing federal funds. 25 However, it is unlikely that
any college or university will be in a financial position to refuse federal
funds. Moreover, Adams does not dismiss the possibility of racially iden-
tifiable schools, and acknowledges the worth of Black institutions. After
accepting the District Court's conclusion that HEW should not neglect
its responsibility to enforce Title VI, the court recited:
The problem of integrating higher education must be dealt with
on a state-wide rather than a school-by-school basis. Perhaps the
most serious problem in this area is the lack of state-wide planning
to provide more and better trained minority group doctors, lawyers,
engineers and other professionals. A predicate for minority access
to quality postgraduate programs is a viable, coordinated state-wide
higher education policy that takes into account the special problems
of minority students and of Black colleges. As amicus points out,
these Black institutions currently fulfill a crucial need and will con-
tinue to play an important role in Black higher education. 26
Thus Adams accepts the general plan of Sanders, yet adopting the
wait-and-see, cautious policy of Alabama State Teachers. HEW has,
subsequent to Adams required the non-complying states to submit plans
under their guidelines to eliminate the vestiges of duality in the higher
education systems. 21
23 289 F. Supp. 784 at 789.
214 80 F.2d 1159 at 1165 (1.973).
25 See Guillory v. Administrator of Tulane University, 203 F. Supp. 855, 858-9 (E.D. La.
1962), aff'd 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962); Sweet Briar Institute v. Button, 280 F. Supp. 312
(W.D. Va. 1967); Coffee v. William Marsh Rice University, 408 S.W. 2d 269 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966). The courts found that although these were private universities there was sufficient
state action in all to require compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment. Another theory
to support desegregation was that since such a premium is placed on education in this country,
and the unlikelihood of success without it, a denial of an opportunity to attend a university
if the state provides one is a denial of equal opportunity. Fraser v. Board of Trustees of the
University of North Carolina, 134 F. Supp. 589, 592 (M.D.N.C. 1955), affd 350 U.S.
979 (1956).
26 480 F.2d 1154 at 1165 (1973); for a discussion of this issue, see Dubois, Does the Negro
Need Separate Schools? Journal of Negro Education (July, 1935); the Summer, 1971 issue of
Daedalus devotes the entire issue to the Future of Black Colleges; for a negative view of Black
Colleges see RIESMAN AND JENCKS, THE ACADEMIC REVOLUTION(1968); a recent book
supports the viability and worth of Black Colleges, MAYHEW, THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION
OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1973).
2" Two letters, those to the proper officials of North Carolina and Mississippi are in the
files of the author.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Adams opinion, viewed in practical terms seeks to accommodate
the positive values of free choice on the higher educational level, with the
problems attendant on the affirmative duty to desegregate. While primary
and secondary school districts have compulsory zoning laws and busing as
a means of eliminating a dual system, the appellants are allowing the non-
complying states to devise plans to allow free choice of schools. These
plans should approach desegregation on a state-by-state basis, thus allowing
great flexibility.2" Predominantly Black institutions have demonstrated
an important role in producing graduates who take meaningful positions in
society. Adams, and Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida29 acknowl-
edges this role of Black institutions. It is difficult to envision white in-
stitutions, in the near future, assuming similar roles. This pragmatic ap-
proach by Adams appreciates HEW's obvious difficulties in achieving
an equitable solution. The goal of having racially unidentifiable schools in
the immediate future is highly unlikely considering the fact that minority
college enrollment has decreased since 1973.30 It has been demonstrated
that the only "good education" does not necessarily have to be an
"integrated education." '3 1
CHARLES H. HOLMES
U.S. v. Robinson : What is Reasonable?
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
provides that the people shall be protected against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and no warrants whall be issued except upon probable cause. I
However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is a long-recognized exception
to the requirement that searches must rest upon warrants issued upon
probable cause. 2 While eliminating the requirement of a warrant in some
instances the courts do require that the search be reasonable to meet the
safeguards of the Fourth Amendment. 3
The Supreme Court of the United States, with Mr. Justice Rehnquist
writing for the majority, has further defined what it considers to be a reason-
28 For a cogent discussion of the inverse effects of Brown v. Board of Education, see
Howie, the Image of Black People in Brown v. Board of Education, I BLACK LAW JOURNAL
234 (1971) in which the writer maintains that Brown supports and reincarnates Dred Scott.
29 Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida et al. 350 U.S. 413 (1956).
30 N.Y. Times, February 3, 1974, at 54.
31 See EDMONDS, JUDICIAL ASSuMPTIONS ON THE VALUE OF INTEGRATED EDUCATION
FOR BLACKS, PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON EDUCATION FOR BLACKS
(1972); The Value of Integrated Education, in THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH CON-
TROVERSY 562.
'U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.
2 Jones v. U.S., 357 U.S. 493, 497 (1958).
3 U.S. v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
6
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1974], Art. 18
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol5/iss2/18
